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Non-Proliferation, Self-Defense, and
the Korean Crisis
Mark E. Newcomb*
ABSTRACT

The United Nations, the United States, and other
interested governments have sought to minimize the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. North Korea's apparent
attempts to begin production of nuclear materials clearly
undermine the goal of non-proliferation. Moreover, the
introductionof nuclearweapons onto the Korean peninsula, a
site of continued political and military tension, has added a
threat of potential nuclear conflict. This Article investigates
the history of the Korean crisis and places North Korea's
attempt to withdrawfrom the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons in the context of the internationalnonproliferationregime andpolicy. The author then examines the
present collective security system and the evolution of the
concept of self-defense in international law, concluding that
the traditionalconcept of self-defense is inadequate to deal
with the problem presented by a nuclear threat. In response
to this crisis, the authorsuggests that the United States first
pursue a peaceful, diplomatic solution. Economic sanctions,
imposed both by the United Nations and by the United States
unilaterally,are the next proposed route. As a last resort, the
authorproposes that the United States should respond to
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North Korean hostilities by Increasing Its military presence In
the Western Pacific and by executing a preventive strike
againstNorth Korean nuclearfacillties.
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INTRODUCTION

I would like, upon authorization, to inform the Security Council of
the United Nations that the Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea decided on 12 March 1993 to withdraw from the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in
accordance with paragraph 1 of Article X of the NPT, in connection
with the extraordinary situation prevailing in the DPRK, which
jeopardizes Its supreme interests.

Kim Yong Nam

1
Minister for Foreign Affairs

With this announcement, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (North Korea) sought to foreclose international scrutiny of

1.

Letter dated March 12, 1993, from the Permanent Representative of

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations, Addressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25405, 2 (1993), reprinted In
32 I.L.M. 602 (1993).
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its nuclear power program and triggered what may- become the
2
third, overt, weapons-related confrontation of the nuclear era.
Although the stated goal of the United Nations, the United States,
and other interested governments has been to minimize or
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and return North
Korea to full compliance with its duties under international
agreements, 3 vigorous agency and state-level diplomatic efforts
have yielded no real progress. Given North Korea's diplomatic
isolation, the history of confrontation on the Korean peninsula,
evidence that Korea's nuclear program may have expanded to
weapons development, 4 and the fact that international stability is
compromised each time a new state possessing nuclear weapons
emerges, a diplomatic solution may prove inadequate.
As
tensions increase, discussion of available options will invariably
turn to restoration of the non-proliferation regime by force.
This crisis raises important questions concerning how and
when the United Nations, or any individual state, may use force

or invoke anticipatory self-defense to eliminate a potential nuclear
threat. Defining the scope of self-defense is particularly troubling
in such an instance. Traditionally, international law has required
that states invoke anticipatory self-defense only when the
necessity for action became "instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means and no moment for deliberation."5 Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter creates further discord. Article 51
has been read to limit the scope of customary law by restricting
self-defense to a response to an "armed attack."6 When weighed
against the devastating potential of nuclear weapons, the current
rule, which imposes a stringent requirement of imminence or
reactivity, is illogical and all but suicidal. Instead, self-defense
should be analyzed by a standard that balances aggressive and
defensive coercion and provides a reasonable foundation for
collective or unilateral use of force.
This Article examines the genesis of the current crisis and
suggests a course of action that permits the use of coercive force.
Part I places North Korea's attempt to withdraw from the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the context of the

2.
3.

See Infra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
S.C. Res. 825, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3212th mtg, at 2, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/825 (1993); William Perry, U.S. Security Policy In Korea, 5 U.S. DEPT. OF
STATE DISPATCH 279 (1994).

4.

5.

See Infra notes 28, 124-26 and accompanying text.
R. Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82,

89 (1938) (quoting LXI Parliamentary Papers (1843) and 30 British and Foreign
State Papers, 193) (emphasis added).
6.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. See Infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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international non-proliferation regime and policy.
Part II
examines the present collective security system and the evolution
of self-defense in the law, and delineates a framework for analysis
of self-defense in the nuclear era. Finally, Part III examines the
Korean crisis in the context of this framework and describes the
circumstances that could justify the use of force to eliminate
North Korea's prospective nuclear threat.

H. PRELUDE TO CRISIS

A. The Non-ProlferatlonRegime

Two imperatives define international relations: the pursuit of
national security and the protection of sovereignty. While these
goals can be compatible, they also create a natural tension in
diplomatic relations. The link between world order and national
security requires that states act in self-preservation by controlling
the actions of other states. International cooperation inherently
requires restriction of the free exercise of sovereign powers. The
concept of collective security--an institutionalized arrangement
for deterring or defeating aggression 7-gained primacy in the early
twentieth century as a means for sustaining world order. 8 This
concept prompted the creation of the League of Nations and its
successor, the United Nations.
As an adjunct to the system of collective security, states that
possessed nuclear weapons, such as the United States, the Soviet
Union, and the United Kingdom, pursued the ratification of a
non-proliferation regime. Through United Nations agencies such
as the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, these states
eventually achieved this goal. 9
The Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty or the
Treaty)1 0 was adopted in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
One hundred fifty-nine states are now signatories to the treaty.1 1
Consistent with the collective security principle of preserving the
status quo, the Non-Proliferation Treaty attempts to limit the

7.

JOHN N. MOORE ETAL., NATIONAL SEcuRrrY LAW 36 (1990).

8.

Id.; see also HAmLTON FOLEY, WOODROW WILSON'S CASE FOR THE LEAouE

OF NATIONS (1923).

9.

MOORE, supra note 7, at 579.

10.
Treaty on the Non-Prollferation of Nuclear Weapons, adopted July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483 (entered into force March 5. 1970), reprintedIn 7 I.L.M. 868
(1968).
11.
1992 International Atomic
[hereinafter 1992 IAEA Report].

Energy Agency

Report

137

(1993)
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number of states possessing nuclear weapons by imposing a
two-tiered system of controls.
Nuclear weapons states are
12
prohibited from transferring applicable weapons technologies,
and non-nuclear weapons states are obligated not to develop or
acquire nuclear weapons technologies. 13
In balancing the
discriminatory purpose of the Treaty, Articles IV and V ensure

that non-nuclear weapons states have full access to nuclear

technologies that are employed for peaceful purposes.' 4 Although
sovereign discretion is limited by accession to the Treaty, it is not
eviscerated; when a signatory finds that "extraordinary events"
relating to nuclear weapons proliferation have jeopardized the
state's "supreme interests," it may withdraw from the NonProliferation Treaty by giving written notice to the United Nations
Security Council. 15
The compliance mechanism delineated in Article III of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty is central to the principle of nonproliferation and critical to the current crisis. In order to access
peaceful nuclear technologies, non-nuclear weapons states must
submit to a safeguard program monitored by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (the Agency).16 The Agency is required to
negotiate and execute specific safeguard programs "with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
7
nuclear

weapons

or

other

nuclear

explosive

devices."'

Safeguards agreements must be in force no later than eighteen
months after the initiation of negotiations between the Agency
and the non-nuclear weapons state; 18 conclusion of these
agreements is a prerequisite to the transfer of nuclear
technologies under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.' 9
The Agency was established as an organ of the United
Nations in 1957 following ratification of the International Atomic
Energy Agency Statute (the Statute or the Agency Statute) by

12.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 10, at

art. I.
13.

Id. art. If.

14.
15.
16.
17.
System to
I.L.M. 512
18.

Id. arts. IV, V.
Id. art. X, para. 1.
Id. art. I, para. 1.
Id. See also International Atomic Energy Agency, Revised Safeguards
Assure That Nuclear Materials are not Used for Military Purposes, 4
(1965) [hereinafter IAEA Revised Safeguards System].
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 10, at

art. Il, para. 4.
19.
Id. art. I, para. 2.
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eighteen states. 20 The Agency serves to "accelerate and enlarge
the contribution of atomic energy to peace" and to ensure that its
services are not "used in such a way to further any military
purpose."2 1

The

Statute

empowers

the Agency

to

apply

safeguards to a nuclear program. Accordingly, the Agency has
the right to examine equipment and facility design, to require the
maintenance and production of records accounting for use and
production of fissionable material, and to set parameters for
inventory, deposit, or disposal of fissionable materials. 22
Although the Statute does not speak to the inspection and
surveillance regime, it is the Agency's practice to employ ad hoc,
routine, and special-or demand-inspections as its primary
means to ensure that fissionable materials are not diverted to
weapons development programs. 23 Failure to comply with a
safeguards agreement is reported to the Agency's Board of
Governors and may result in suspension or curtailment of Agency
assistance, a call for the return of materials made available by the
Agency or members, suspension of membership in the Agency, or
a report of non-compliance to the Security Council and the
General Assembly of the United Nations.2
At the outset, the Non-Proliferation Treaty suffered from two
significant weaknesses. First, the Treaty was not ratified by all
states possessing nuclear weapons. 25 The failure to encompass
all nuclear weapons states within the non-proliferation regime
seriously weakened its effect, providing a source of fissionable
nuclear materials and technologies to non-signatory states
without nuclear weapons. Second, the Treaty did not provide the

20.

Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency done Oct. 26, 1956,

prologue, art. XXII, para. e (1990). 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873 (entered into
force July 29, 1957) [hereinafter IAEA Statute].

21.
Id. art. H. The Agency Is structured in three parts. The General
Conference includes all Members of the United Nations, as well as any other state
that ratifies the Statute. Id. art. IV. The Board of Governors, a forty-member
body selected on criteria encompassing technological achievement and regional
representation, is responsible for determining agency policy and carrying out

statutory functions.

Id. art. VI. Daily administration of the agency, including

inspection functions carried out by the technical staff, Is the responsibility of the
Director-General, subject to Board of Governors regulation. Id. art. VII.
22.
Id. art. XII.
23.
See Eric Wemple, Preventing the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
MultilateralEfforts and U.S. Attempts-InternationalControls Under the NPT and the
IAEA, EXPORT CONTROL NEws, Mar. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,

CURNWS File.
24.
LAEA Statute, supra note 20, prologue, art. XXII, para.c.
25.
France and the People's Republic of China, who both possessed
nuclear weapons at the time that the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, did
not accede to the Treaty's terms until 1992. 1992 IAEA Report at 137 (1993);
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pub. No. 9433; TREATIES IN FORCE 375-76 (1993).
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Agency with any positive mechanism for enforcing safeguards
agreements.
Compliance with safeguards agreements is
dependent upon the good will of signatory states, and sanctions
for non-compliance are severely limited by diplomatic maneuvers
and alliances. 2 8 Nonetheless, in spite of its weaknesses, the NonProliferation Treaty has proven to be a reasonable and relatively
effective counter to the proliferation of nuclear weapons
27
technologies.
B. Non-ProlferationTreaty Obligationsand
North Korea'sNuclearProgram
North Korea ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty on
December 12, 1985, and concluded a safeguards agreement with
the Agency on January 30, 1992.2 8 This agreement conforms to
the Agency's statutory mandates and reflects its practices as
developed over the past twenty-five years. 29 North Korea is
26.

See STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., THE NPT:

THE MAIN

POLITICAL BARRIER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION 21-22 (1980).
27.
See generally Ray Silver, Ex-Safeguards Head Sees Threat Continuing
from Iraq, North Korea, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Oct. 21, 1993, at 7. availableIn LEXIS,
Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
28.
Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic People's
Republic of North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/403, May 1992, reprinted In 33 I.L.M.
315 (1994) [hereinafter IAEA/DPRK Safeguards Agreement].
Although the

Safeguards Agreement did not take effect until April 10, 1992, five facilities at the
Yongbyon complex, including a five-megawatt, graphite-modulated, uranium core
experimental reactor--capable of producing plutonium, a weapons grade
material, as a by-product-a uranium fuel rod fabrication plant, and a fuel
reprocessing facility were in service before the arrival of the Agency's first
inspection mission in May 1992. David Holley, U.S. Group Tells of N. Korea
A-Pledge, L.A. TIMES, May 6. 1992, at A24. In addition, North Korea was operating
uranium core concentration plants at Pakchon and Pyongsan, a nuclear research
laboratory at Pyongyang, and had begun construction of two more power plants at
Yongbyon and Taechon. The finalized Safeguards Agreement was approved by the
Agency's Board of Governors on September 12, 1991, and signed by both parties
in Vienna on January 20, 1992. The agreement entered into force in April 1992,
after North Korea notified the Agency's Director-General that it had taken
adequate statutory and constitutional steps to be bound by the agreement.
IAEA/DPRK Safeguards Agreement, supra. See also Lynn Davis, Korea: No
Capitulation, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1994, at A21; Bruce W. Nelan, A Game of
Nuclear Roulette. TIME, Jan. 10, 1994, at 28-29.
Prior to the Safeguards
Agreement, North Korea's source of nuclear technologies and materidl appears to
have been the former Soviet Union. See Andrew Browne, Nuclear Fears on
Agenda at Pyongyang Conferences, REUTER LIBR. REP., Apr. 28, 1991, availableIn
LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
29.
See generally IAEA/DPRK Safeguards Agreement, supra note 28;
Extension of IA.E.A. Safeguards System to Reprocessing Plants, IAEA Doc.
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obligated to accept safeguards on all fissionable materials, 30 to
provide a preliminary accounting of materials and facilities,3 1 to
maintain a system for accounting and control of fissionable
materials,3 2 and to provide annual reports of safeguarded
Concomitantly, the Agency is authorized
materials inventory.3
and obligated to apply safeguards to North Korea's nuclear
programs and may employ ad hoc, routine, and special
inspections to ensure compliance.34 Inspections may encompass
examination of records, independent measurement of safeguarded
materials inventory, physical examination of facilities, and use of
permanent surveilance and containment measures.35
From the outset, it was difficult to determine whether North
Korea complied with the Safeguards Agreement. After receipt of
North Korea's initial report on May 4, 1992, the Agency's
technical staff conducted six ad hoc inspections of facilities design
and material records. They also installed containment seals and
Inconsistencies between the
video surveillance systems.
inspectors' observations and North Korea's initial reports were
reviewed during the fourth and fifth ad hoc missions.3 6 During

GC(x)/INF/86 (July 8, 1966), reprinted In 5 I.L.M. 987 (1966); IAEA Revised
Safeguards System, supra note 17; Extension of I.A.E.A. Safeguards System to
Large Nuclear Reactors to Assure that Nuclear Materials are Not Used for Military
Purposes, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/26/Add.1 (Apr. 9. 1964), reprinted In 3 I.L.M. 496
(1964).
IAEA/DPRK Safeguards Agreement. supra note 28, art. 1. Exceptions
30.
to the safeguard program are discussed in Articles 14, 36 and 37. Article 14
allows North Korea to use nuclear materials that would otherwise be subject to
safeguards for a peaceful, non-proscribed military activity (i.e.. weapons
development). Id. art. 14. Small amounts of fissionable materials, when used in
sensing component instruments or non-nuclear activities, are exempted from the
safeguards by article 36. Id. art. 36. Finally, North Korea may accumulate up to
one Idlogram of special fissionable materials (plutonium or enriched uranium),
ten metric tons of natural or depleted uranium with enrichment greater than
0.05%, twenty metric tons of natural or depleted uranium enriched at less than
0.05%, and twenty metric tons of thorium without application of the safeguards.
Id. art. 37.
Id. arts. 8, 42-48.
31.
Id. arts. 7. 31-32, 51-58.
32.
Id. arts. 59-65, 68.
33.
Id. arts. 71-73.
34.
In 1989, the Agency supplemented physical plant
35.
Id. 74-75.

inspections by beginning use of photographic and electronic surveillance systems
and attaching containment seals to supplement physical plant inspections. See
Wemple, supranote 23.
36.
Note by the Secretary-General,Letter dated 17 September 1993from the
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Addressed to the
Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, Annex, at 3, Doc. S/25456/Add. 1 (1993)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/254561; Letter dated 15 March 1993from the Permanent
Representative of the DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea to the United Nations,
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the sixth ad hoc inspection, Agency inspectors and North Korea's
technical representatives attempted to resolve the differences in
their data.
Dissatisfied with North Korea's explanation, the
Agency technical staff determined that "the correctness and
completeness" of the initial report on inventory could not be
confirmed, and reported their findings to the Director General. 37
On February 9, 1993, Director General Hans Blix proposed a
special inspection for the purpose of rectifying the "significant
inconsistencies" between North Korea's declaration and the
Agency's findings, and requested access to "specific additional
information and to two locations where the Agency had reason to
believe there existed nuclear waste which might be of safeguards
relevance." Ss
In response, North Korea agreed to continue
discussions regarding inconsistencies, but refused to grant the
Agency access to the additional sites.3 9 North Korea asserted that
the two sites in question, both military installations, had

previously been inspected by the Agency in September 1992 and
found to be not at all relevant to nuclear activities. North Korea
therefore concluded that it had no duty to reopen them for
inspection. 4 0
Stymied by North Korea's intransigence, Director General Blix
referred the matter to his Board of Governors (the Board) under
Article XII of the Agency Statute. 4 1 The Board considered the
Director General's report and determined that access to the
additional Information was "essential and urgent" to ensure that
North Korea was complying with the Safeguards Agreement. 4 2
The Board approved a resolution that called for immediate
cooperation by North Korea and extension of access to the
requested information and sites. The Board also directed that

Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, Annex, at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/25442 (1993) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/25422].
37.
U.N. Doc. S/25422, supra note 36, at 4-5; U.N. Doc. 25456, supra note
36, at 3.
38.
U.N. Doe. S/25456, supra note 36, at 3. Agency inspectors found that
the composition and quantity of plutonium declared did not correspond with their
own calculations and that the isotopic composition of the plutonium extracted by
the inspection team did not correspond with that of the declared liquid waste.
U.N. Doc. S/25422, supra note 36, at 4-5. The requested additional sites

allegedly harbor nuclear wastes from illicit plutonium production that occurred
prior to the conclusion of the 1992 Safeguards Agreement. R. Jeffirey Smith, N.
Korea to Allow Inspections. WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1994, at Al.
39.
U.N. Doc. S/25456. supra note 36, at 3.
40.
U.N. Doe. S/25422, supra note 36, at 6.
41.
IAEA Statute, supra note 20, art. XII.
42.
Resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors on the Implementation of

Safeguards In the DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea, adopted In 25 February
1993, 35 IAEA BULL. 41 (1993), IAEA Doe. GOV/2636 (Feb. 25, 1993).
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dialogue with North Korea continue with a view toward settlement
of the disagreement. 4 3 Consistent with the Board's position,
Director General Blix forwarded a copy of the resolution to North
Korea and requested the receipt of his special inspection mission
on March 16, 1993, at Pyongyang.
Once again, the North Korean government refused to comply.
Choi Hak Gun, North Korea's Minister of Atomic Energy,
denounced the Board's resolution as "unjust" and reserved
consideration of receipt of the inspection team based upon
mobilization of North Korea to a state of "semi-war."4 4 Director
General Blix replied that same day, advising the North Korean
North
minister that the claimed state of "semi-war" did not relieve
45
Korea of its obligation to receive the inspection mission.
North Korea's response was startling. Minister Kim Yong
Nam announced North Korea's intent to withdraw from the Non-

Proliferation Treaty. This announcement was accompanied by an
official government statement detailing the "grave situation" that
North Korea
allegedly threatened North Korea's security.
denounced the resumption of "Team Spirit"-a joint military
exercise of the United States and the Republic of Korea (South
Korea)-as a "nuclear war rehearsal."4 6 North Korea also decried
the Agency's demand for a special inspection as coordinated
machinations of the United States designed to encroach upon
North Korean sovereignty, interfere with internal affairs, and stifle
North Korean socialism. 47 To define the threat faced by the North
Korean people, the government pointed to these "hostile" acts, the

Id.
43.
44.
Letter Dated March 19, 1993 from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to
the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, Annex I, at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/25445, at 9 [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/25445].
45.
Id. at 10.
46.
See Letter Dated 13 April 1993 From the PermanentRepresentative of
the DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea to the United Nations, Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, Annex. at 2. U.N. Doc. S/25595
(1993). Team Spirit is an annual exercise which involves virtually all 35,000
United States troops stationed in South Korea, a significant majority of South
Korea's 650,000 troops, and approximately 20,000 U.S. troops who deploy to the
peninsula for the exercise. The purpose of the exercise is to prepare for defense
of South Korea against an invasion launched from North Rorea and focuses on
the problems associated with rapid, full-scale deployment to a combat zone.
Cessation of the exercise had been used as a bargaining chip in 1990 to convince
North Korea to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. William Matthews, North Korea
Deal May Cost Team Spirit '94, NAVY TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1994, at 23. Team Spirit
resumed in 1992. William Matthews, N. Korean Cooperation Cancels Team Spirit,
ARMY TaMS, Mar. 14, 1994, at 8.

Letter Dated 12 March 1993 From the PermanentRepresentative of the
47.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations Addressed to the
Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25407, at 2
(1993) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/25407].
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United States failure to permit the inspection of U.S. nuclear

weapons and bases in South Korea, 48 and the Agency's "tacit"
approval of the Japanese and South Korean movements towards
nuclear armament. 49 In subsequent statements, North Korea
criticized the Agency's lack of impartiality and claimed that its
insistence on access to the two North Korean military sites was no
more than an attempt by the United States to confirm military
intelligence gained by "espionage satellite or by high-altitude
reconnaissance plane . .
.
[in] violation of [North Korea's]
sovereignty."5 0
On March 30, 1993, the Agency's Board of Governors met to
consider North Korea's announced withdrawal from the NonProliferation Treaty, the statement by the North Korean
government that delineated its reasons for withdrawal, and the
Director General's report on the status of the Safeguards
Agreement. After two days of deliberation, the Board adopted a
resolution declaring that North Korea had not complied with the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and referred its finding to the UN
Security Council and the UN General Assembly.
C. On the Brink
In the two and a half decades between general ratification of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and North Korea's announcement of
withdrawal from the Treaty, the emergence of four de facto
nuclear weapons states-Israel, India, Pakistan, and South
Africa 5 1 -has significantly affected the purpose of the nonproliferation regime. Although states possessing nuclear weapons
continue to view any expansion of the "nuclear club" as

48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 2-4.
Letter dated April 6, 1993, from the Permanent Representative of the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations, Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, Annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/25538

(1993).

North Korea accused the Agency of handing over secret information-obtained
in the course of inspections-to the United States and of using "fabricated
'satellite intelligence information' provided by the United States" as the basis of
the special inspection request. Letter Dated May 10, 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of the DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea to the United Nations,
Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, Annex, at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/25474 (1993).
51.
South Africa recently confirmed its development of nuclear weapons in
the late 1970s and plans to abandon its program. Lee Hamilton, Bomb Scares,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1994, at A21. See generally John M. Deutch, The New
Nuclear Threat, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 120 (1992) (discussing recent nuclear
proliferation).
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destabilizing for the international security system, 52 the
overarching bar to proliferation has given way to the creation of a
comprehensive limitation and security system that would
minimize proliferation. 53 This subtle shift reflects the primacy of
caution.

Rather than taking any action that may accelerate a

nuclear crisis, states possessing nuclear weapons have replaced
non-proliferation with counter-proliferation.
In its initial response to the Agency's report of North Korea's
non-compliance, the Security Council encouraged the Agency to
continue its discussions with North Korea n order to settle the
verification issue and announced that it would merely "follow the
situation."54 After an exchange of notes, the Agency and North

Korea agreed that the Safeguards Agreement remained in force
during the ninety-day pendency of withdrawal. 5 5 In addition,
North Korea permitted a seventh inspection mission to perform
containment, surveillance,
and equipment maintenance activities
58
at several reactor sites.
While discussions continued between the Agency and North
Korea, the United States initiated bilateral talks with North
Korea. 57 After the first round of these discussions, North Korea
announced on June 11, 1993, that it would "unilaterally suspend,
as long as it considers it necessary, the effectuation of its
withdrawal" from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and agreed not to
take any further steps towards the acquisition or development of
nuclear weapons.58 At a second round of discussions in July, the
United States sought, and apparently received, North Korea's
commitment to continue discussions with the Agency regarding
52.

Of particular concern are: the possible domino effect of acquisition,

that is, several non-nuclear weapons states acquire weapons in response to a
regional adversary's acquisition; the increased probability of accidental or
unauthorized use due to unreliable command and control procedures; increased
temptation to employ nuclear weapons in a localized conflict, particularly when
first-strike weapons are vulnerable to attack; escalation of regional conflict to
global proportions due to use of nuclear weapons; and proliferation of nuclear

weapons by an unstable or renegade regime. In sum, international relations take
on a greater-and presumably unmanageable-complexity with the existence of
multiple, adversarial states possessing nuclear weapons. See STOCKHOLM INTL
PEACE RESEARCH INST., POSTURES FOR NON-PROLIFERATION: ARMS LIMITATION AND

SECURITY POLICIES TO MImNmE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 5 (1993); see generally
HERMAN KAHN, ON ESCALATION (1965); AvOIDING WAR: PROBLEMS OF CRISIS
MANAGEMENT (Alexander L. George, ed., 1991)
53.
STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., supra note 52.

54.

Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N.

Doe.

S/25562

(1993) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/25562].
55.
Id. at 4-6; see also Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

supra note 10, art. x.
56.

U.N. Doc. S/25562, supra note 54, at 6.

57.
58.

Perry, supra note 3, at 275.
Id.; see also U.N. Doc. S/25456, supra note 36, at 7.
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"full scope" safeguards 5 9 and North Korea's promise to reopen
discussions with South Korea concerning a prior denuclearization
agreement.6o Further discussions between the United States and
North Korea were suspended, awaiting settlement of the
61
verification issue.
Over the next five months, North Korea and the Agency staff
sought to resolve their disagreement while the United States
pursued international support for enforcement of the nonproliferation regime. In the course of discussions, North Korea
took the position that its situation was a "unique and
extraordinary situation." Because it temporarily suspended its
withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea had
opened all issues relating to the implementation of the Safeguards
Agreement to renegotiation. 6 2 As a result, North Korea was only
willing to discuss a one-time mission to verify containment seals
and to complete maintenance on installed surveillance systems.6
On the other hand, the Agency was willing to discuss its request
for additional information and access to additional sites.
However, the Agency wanted to carry out ad hoc and routine
64
inspection activities in accordance with the prior agreement.
Because the parties took directly conflicting positions, little

progress was made. On several occasions, Director General Blix
announced compliance deadlines and threatened to submit
another non-compliance report to the Security Council.6 5 He
posited that timely resumption of safeguards was critical to
provide the needed assurances regarding the peaceful use of
declared nuclear material and facilities.6
In February 1994, North Korea finally agreed to permit the
Agency to inspect its declared nuclear facilities. 6 7 When they
subsequently balked and tried to link the Agency's mission to
reopening bilateral discussions with the United States,6s the
Clinton Administration agreed to suspend Team Spirit and to
resume political discussions with North Korea on March 21,

59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Perry, supra note 3. at 275.

Id.
Id.
U.N. Doc. S/25456, supra note 36, at 5-6.
Id.
Id.
Smith, supra note 38, at Al.
U.N. Doc. S/25456, supra note 36, at 8.
Smith, supra note 38, at Al.
Thomas W. Lippman, As N. Korea Balks, U.S. Predicts Nuclear
Inspections Wl Go On, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1993, at A28.
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1994.69 Although an Agency inspection team was allowed to
enter North Korea in March, the North Korean government did not
grant access to the Yongbyon reactor and again halted completion
of the ad hoc inspection. 70 On May 15, North Korea announced
that it was withdrawing spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor
without an Agency team present, asserting that the Agency's
"unreasonable inspection demands.., had left [North Korea] no
choice but to begin the unmonitored withdrawal s]."71
At this point, a period of rapid and contradictory
developments in the crisis began. As the United States searched
for international support for sanctions against North Korea, the
Agency received a telex from the North Korean government
indicating North Korea's willingness to receive Agency officials for
consultations regarding the defueling. North Korea then offered
to suspend fuel reprocessing in exchange for a firm commitment
by the United States to extend diplomatic assistance and
recognition. 72 However, the Agency cut off minor technical
assistance in response to North Korea's persistent refusal to allow
comprehensive analysis of the nuclear fuel. In turn, North Korea
announced its immediate withdrawal from the Agency and barred
Agency inspectors from its Yongbyon facilities. 7 3 In response to

this situation, the United States proffered a "phased-in approach"
to sanctions, hoping that a grace period would induce North
Korea to remain within the Agency and to remain a party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.7 4
In mid-June, following an unofficial diplomatic mission by
former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, North Korean President Kim
1-Sung agreed to suspend any withdrawal from the nonproliferation regime, to freeze North Korea's nuclear program, and

Thomas W. Lippman & T.R. Reid, N.Korea Nuclear Inspection Begins,
69.
WASH. POST, Mar. 4. 1994, at Al.
R. Jeffrey Smith, Inspectors Returning to North Korea, WASH. POST, May
70.
14, 1994, at A14. The Agency scheduled another ad hoc inspection to begin in
mid-May 1994, but the team was not allowed to take samples from the Yongbyon
reactor, which might evidence removal of plutonium for reprocessing, nor was it
granted access to the two undeclared nuclear sites. Id.
R Jeffrey Smith, N. Korea Defies Atomic Energy Agency, WASH. POST,
71.
May 15, 1994, at A29. North Korea initiated the withdrawal of fuel rods despite

warnings from Secretary of Defense William J. Perry that the procedure would
cause the United States to seek economic sanctions against North Korea through
the UN Security Council. Id. at A31.
T.R. Reid, Accord Near on N. Korean Sanctions, WASH. POST, Jun. 11,
72.
1994, at Al.
73.
R. Jeffrey Smith & T.R. Reid, N. Korea Quits U.N. Nuclear Body, WASH.
POST, Jun. 14, 1994, at Al, A16.
74.
R. Jeffirey Smith, U.S. Plans to Seek N. Korea Sanctions, WASH. POST,
Jun. 1, 1994, at A22; Daniel Williams, U.S. Considers Gradual Path on N Korea,
WASH. POST, Jun. 2, 1994, at Al, A28.
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to allow the Agency's inspectors to remain in place at the
Yongbyon complex. In exchange, the United States agreed to
open comprehensive, high-level talks between North Korea, South
Korea, and the United States. 7" After more than a year of
sensitive negotiations and contentious posturing, the situation
had, at best, returned to square one. By continuing to deny
access to the additional facilities and taking actions that
decreased the likelihood that accurate and positive controls were
available to the Agency, North Korea had actually regressed from
the stance that resulted in the Agency's original declaration of
non-compliance. North Korea had gained a political advantage.7 8
I.

SELF-DEFENSE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

A. United Nations Enforcement of InternationalObligations
From its inception in 1947, the United Nations declared
purpose has been to maintain international order by use of
"effective collective measures for the . . . removal of threats to
peace.""7 By deterring aggression, the United Nations acts to
protect the values of all states. When pacific settlement of a
dispute cannot be achieved by negotiation or mediation, the issue
may be submitted to the Security Council for resolution. 78 Acting
for all states that are members of the United Nations, the Security
Council may determine whether a threat to peace exists and the
scope of action necessary to neutralize the threat.7 9 If "measures
not involving the use of armed force," such as condemnation or
economic sanctions, are insufficient, the Security Council may
employ force to remove the threat.8 0
75.

Clinton OKs July Talks with N. Korea, SAN DIEGo UNION-TRB., Jun. 23,

1993, Al, A23. In accepting the North Korean commitment as a basis for further
negotiation, the United States apparently abandoned its prior demand that North
Korea preserve evidence of the 1989 Yongbyon fuel extraction. This evidence may
have confirmed that North Korea previously reprocessed and diverted plutonium
to a weapons program. Id. at A23. See also R. Jeffrey Smith and Julia Preston,
Nuclear Watchdog Group Says N. Korea Steps Up Fuel Rod Withdrawal, WASH.
POST, Jun. 26, 1994, at Al, A10; R. Jeffrey Smith & Ann Devroy, Carter's Call
from N. Korea Offered Option, WASH. POST, Jun. 26, 1994, at Al, A10.

76.

See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.

-

77.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 1.
78.
Id. arts. 33-38. The Security Council is the organ within the United
Nations with primary responsibility for maintenance of the international peace
and security. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
79.
Id. arts. 39-42.
80.
Id. arts. 42-43.
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Ideally, the synergy between the UN Charter and the NonProliferation Treaty should result in a timely and reasoned
response to non-compliance. As the Korean crisis illustrates, it
has not. Although the Security Council has received at least
fifteen communiques from the Agency and North Korea on this
issue, action has been limited to two nonbinding statements. The
first statement requested that North Korea honor its obligations
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The second statement asked
North Korea to abide by its "1992 pledge to allow unfettered
Agency access to its declared nuclear sites."8 1

The reluctance to take direct action originates with the
People's Republic of China, one of North Korea's few allies. The
Chinese favor negotiated denuclearization instead of "exerting
pressure and intensifying contradictions."8 2 In 1993, Premier Li
Peng publicly announced that China would oppose use of
83
economic sanctions to compel compliance from North Korea.
That stance, coupled with the prospect of a Chinese veto to
proposed Security Council action against North Korea, has
effectively blocked any coercive action against North Korea by the
United Nations. 84
With the United Nations unable, or unwilling, to act, the
world reverts to a primitive system in which the general
In these
community cannot protect individual members. 8 5
circumstances, individual states must act to preserve peace while
securing their own defense and serving national interests. 86 In

81.
S.C. Res. 825. supra note 3; Smith, supra note 70, at A14.
82.
China Opposes Oil Embargo on North Korea, REUTERS. Dec. 21, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
83.
Steven Mufson, China Says No Sanctionson N. Korea, WASH.POST, Dec.
27, 1993, at A13.
China has also played an
84.
See U.N. CHARTER, art. 27, para. 3.
important behind-the-scenes role in persuading North Korea to slow or freeze its
nuclear program. Shortly after North Korea announced Its intent to withdraw
China delivered a communiqu6 to North Korea
from the Agency in June.
indicating that North Korea's economic and diplomatic interests-particularly
reunification of the Korean peninsula-would be served best by cooperating with
the nuclear inspection and non-proliferation regime. See U.S. Credits Chinafor
Reining inN.Korea, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jun. 29, 1994, at Al, A9.
85.
Myres S. McDougal, Editorial Comment, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine
and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 597-98 (1963).
86.
This Article does not discuss United States policy in detail. Instead,

three propositions are assumed. First, U.S. policy is defined by several enduring
historical interests: 1) defense of the United States and its constitutional system;
2) enhancement of the United States economic well-being and promotion of U.S.
products at home; 3) creation of a favorable world order (international security
environment); and 4) promotion of the United States democratic values and the
free market system abroad. See DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN, AMERICA RECOMMITTED:
UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS INA RESTRUCTURED WORLD 17 (199 1).
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taking these actions, states must ensure compliance with the
precepts of both conventional and customary international law.
B. The Law of Self-Defense
While the use of force is contrary to general principles and
goals of the United Nations, the UN Charter speaks to both
aggression and self-defense, prohibiting aggression but permitting
self-defense. The UN Charter outlaws aggression, which it defines
as "[t]he use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, or political independence of another State."8 7
In contrast, Article 51 of the Charter provides that self-defense,
the fundamental and customary right of a sovereign to protect its
territorial integrity and independence by use of force, remains
unimpaired. 8 Customary law limits the right of self-defense only
by the concepts of necessity and proportionality. 8 9
As a rule, the right of self-defense has also been viewed as
broad enough to permit anticipatory responses to imminent
Second, national interests may be quantified on a sliding scale: Survival, or

critical, national interests are most important, followed by vital or dangerous
interests, major or serious interests, and peripheral interests. Id, Vital interests
differ from survival interests principally in the amount of time that a state has to
decide how to respond to an external threat; vital interests encompass a potential

or probable, but not imminent danger. Id. at 19. Our interest in the
denuclearization of North Korea, or non-proliferation in general, would be vital,
rather than survival.
Finally, United States political strategy is based on democratization and the
efficient use of collective security to ensure world peace. See John Norton Moore,
Symposium, Low-Intensity Conflict and the International Legal System, Remarks
at the Naval War College, Low Intensity Conflict Symposium 11, April 9-10, 1992,
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
87.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 24; G. A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., at 19,
U.N. Doc. A/9890 (1974).
88.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 51; see also McDougal, supra note 85, at 598.
89.
Necessity is defined by the availability of peaceful modalities to resolve
conflict, the nature of coercion applied by an opponent, the objectives of each
party, the parties' impact on world order, and the likelihood of effective
community intervention. MYRS S. McDOUGAL & FLoRmNo P. FELiciANo, LAw AND
MiumWORLD PUBLIC ORDER 229-30 (1961). Proportionality is a limitation of the
means and time of action; force used in self-defense must be directed at the
threat itself and may not continue after the danger or threat has been neutralized.
See McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine, supra note 85, at 602-04; Uri
Shoham, The Israeli Aerial Raid Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactorand the Right of Self
Defense, 109 MIL. L. REv. 191, 193 (1985). Some commentators would assert
that "[c]ustomary law prescribes the use of peaceful procedures, if they are
available, as the first requirement of self-defense." W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V.
Mallison, The IsraeliAerial Attack of June 7, 1981, Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor:
Aggression or Self-Defense. 75 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 419 (1982). Others
argue the absence of peaceful recourse is generally treated as a component of
necessity. See generally McDougal, supra note 85.
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threats. First recognized in the Caroline case,9 0 anticipatory selfdefense requires a degree of imminence that precludes reflective
action. While commentators have debated the impact of Article
51 on the scope of self-defense, 9 1 the imminence requirement is
widely viewed as having been altered by the advance of weapons
technologies. As weapons have greater range and have become
more lethal, the point of imminency has moved further in time
from the actual moment of aggressive use. Customary application
of the Caroline criteria for anticipatory self-defense has been
characterized as requiring "paralysis."9 2 In order to provide a
reasonable modem standard, a determination of necessity, and
specifically imminence, should move beyond the paradigm of time
to include "an appraisal of the total impact . . . of coercive
activities."9 3

90.

See Jennings, supra note 5, at 89.

91.
Two schools of interpretation have developed with respect to Article 51
of the UN Charter and the customary law of self-defense. The restrictive school
would justify self-defense only in response to an armed attack. This school of

thought views Article 51 as exhaustive and relies on a literal reading of the

Article, which preserves the right of self-defense "if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations." The restrictive view is reinforced by the
obligation of Article 33 to seek peaceful means to settle international disputes.
U.N. CHARTER, arts. 33-51. Under a restrictive-view analysis, Article 51 prohibits
any action not explicitly mentioned. While protecting the right of self-defense,
this approach would extinguish anticipatory self-defense. See Quincy Wright, The
CubanQuarantine,57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963).
The broad interpretation of Article 51 arises from a balanced analysis of the
prohibition on the threat and use of aggressive force in Article 2(4), the historic
development of the right of self-defense, and the underlying intent of the UN
Charter's framers to preserve the right of self-defense rather than restrict It. By
allowing the full breadth of the customary right, impermissible acts of coercion
are effectively countered by permissible or defensive coercion. To accept the
restrictive view would be to "compel a defending state to allow its assailant to
deliver the first and perhaps fatal blow." C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the
Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 451, 498
(1953); see also McDougal, supra note 85, at 599-600.
The restrictive approach depends upon a myopic Interpretation of the phrase
"armed attack." The restrictive approach fails to address linguistic differences in
other language versions-specifically, the French version uses the term
"aggression armee," or armed aggression-that are consistent with the
preservation of anticipatory self-defense, and it denies the dynamic nature of
international law. "International law, like all living law, is in a process of
continuous growth and adaptation to new needs and circumstances." Louis
HENUiN, ImRNATIONAL LAW 91 (1980). In sum, the broad interpretation of Article
51 is more pervasive.
92.
McDouGAL & FELiciANO, supra note 89, at 217; see also Ma~lson &
Mallison, supra note 89. at 348.
93.
McDougal, supra note 85, at 598.

1994]

KOREAN CRISIS

C. Frameworkfor Analysis: Necessity and Preventive Self-Defense
Historically, anticipatory self-defense has focused on preempting rather than preventing aggression. For example, state X
could lawfully attack and destroy a weapon in state Y at the
ultimate moment before state Y uses the weapon against state
X. 9 4 Israel used this type of peremptory attack against Egypt and
Syria in the Six Days War. This example illustrates that the
decision to use force under UN Charter Article 51 is generally a
conditioned reflex to stress. 95
In the context of nuclear
confrontation, with its attendant risks of escalation and massive

destruction, reasoned rather than reflexive action is preferred and
should be fostered. Despite the natural tendency toward preemption in this paradigmatic situation, when the threat to a
state's survival or vital interests is not immediate, but may be
predicted as the logical conclusion of a course of events, a
preventive action is preferable to preemptive reaction.95
If a standard of preventive self-defense is adopted, it must
sanction reasoned action at the earliest opportunity without
empowering the use of force against a speculative or
unsubstantiated threat. Framed properly, a preventive standard
defines a clear course of action, and, critically, provides the
international community with a means with which to judge any
action taken. The legal precept of self-defense is inherently
retrospective; once a state has chosen to use force, the legality of
the act is not determined by the depth of the state's explanation,
but by how closely the act corresponds to the pattern of practice
97
sanctioned by the international community.
The standard for preventive self-defense should merely
redirect interpretation of customary law principles from time to
the quantum, or scope, of coercion. - In response to a nuclear
threat, a lawful claim of self-defense should be available to a state
which has:

94.

See, e.g., Charles W. Yost, The Arab Israeli War: How It Began, and

Quincy Wright, The Middle East Crisis, and Amos Shapira, The Six Day War and
the Right of Self Defense in 2 THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLIcT 5-21, 107-32, 205-20

(John N. Moore ed., 1974).
95.
Eugene V. Rostow, Law is Not a Suicide Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1983,
at A35.
96.
See MooRE ET AL., supra note 7, at 154. Until the moment that the
aggressive weapon is deployable and ready for use, any counter-measure must be

considered preventive. Once the weapon is deployable, the focus shifts to the
prospective moment of its use, and self-defense becomes a preemptive act.
97.

Rostow, supra note 95.
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1) reasonably determined that nuclear weapons are to be used as
an aggressive force against It;
2) affirmatively pursued alternative modalities of resolution and
remained engaged in the diplomatic process until the ultimate
moment of action;
3) acted only after the aggressor's conduct has coalesced into a
coherent nuclear threat; and
4) achieved minimal destruction, using only as much force as
necessary to effectively eliminate the threat.9 8

The

existence

of a

nuclear

threat

Is

a fact-specific

determination that encompasses both the manifest intent and
technical abilities of the aggressor. 99 In determining intent, the
relationship between the parties is critical. Past aggressive acts,
disregard for sovereign integrity, violations of the laws of
war-particularly with respect to civilians-and repetitive threats

of future action may support a reasonable apprehension of attack.
On the other hand, prior peaceful relationships should require a
direct and specific threat of the use of force to provide justification
for self-defense. From a technical perspective, the aggressor must
have obtained or developed nuclear technologies as well as a
system for delivery of nuclear weapons. The potential victim must
employ all reasonably available means to detect the development
of nuclear technologies, including intelligence available from other
states. The potential victim also should have no second-strike or
deterrent nuclear forces available. 1 °0 In sum, evaluation of the
facts must lead a reasonable person to believe that the

preservation of territorial integrity and political independence
require the use of military force.

In addition, the potential victim should not resort to force
unless the existence of nuclear weapons would critically alter the
military status quo. A preventive strike will be lawful when the
state finds that further delay will compromise its security and will
unreasonably increase the possibility of harm to its civilian
population.1 0 1
While a preventive attack should effectively

98.
See YORAM DiNSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF DEFENSE 165-90
(1988); Beth M. Polebaum, Note, National Self-Defense In International Law: An
Emerging Standardfora NuclearAge, 59 N.Y.U.L. REv. 187, 208-17 (1984).
99.
Polebaum, supra note 98, at 210-11.
100. This last criterion, however, should not be applied to a third-state
intervenor that is not directly threatened by the aggressor's nuclear weapons. For
an example, where state X is threatened by state Y, the existence of a nuclear
arsenal at the disposal of state Z, X's military ally, is not relevant. If state X. the
threatened state, has no credible capability to employ nuclear weapons against Y,
Z must be allowed to act on X's behalf within the principles of mutual self-defense
and treaty obligations. To do otherwise would vitiate the purpose and effect of the
bilateral defense agreement. All other preventive self-defense criteria would
otherwise apply.
101. IcLat2ll.
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eliminate the nuclear threat, the use of force should be
proportional and limited to the facilities that relate directly to the
threat. Nuclear weapons, platforms, depots, and laboratories, as
well as fissionable material storage and manufacturing sites,
would all be lawful targets. On the other hand, conventional
military facilities, economic centers, and civilian targets would be
prohibited. The potential victim must choose its targets so that it
achieves its purpose with a minimum of destruction to the
of nuclear weapons
prospective aggressor; therefore, the1 0use
2
would be disproportionate force per se.
More importantly, the potential victim must continuously
seek to resolve the threat by other means until the absolute last
By affirmatively seeking peaceful remedies, the
moment.
potential victim will publicize the aggressor state's intent and
encourage third-party intervention. The international community
will thereby be able to discern the objectives of both parties,
determine if they present an extension or conservation of
community values, and prepare for the consequences of any
action. 103
D. Preventive Acts: The CubanMissile Crisis and Tuwaitha
Although the nuclear age opened with the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki In 1945 and expanded to a critical
standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union in the
1950s, only two incidents of nuclear confrontation have occurred
in the last half-century-the United States quarantine of Cuba in
1962 and the Israeli attack on an experimental nuclear-powered
reactor at Tuwaitha, Iraq, in 1980. Each focused on a perceived
nuclear threat, but evoked distinctly different reactions from the
international community. In both cases, the defending state, or
potential victim, invoked self-defense and reacted with force
before aggression with nuclear weapons was actually possible.
The Cuban Missile Crisis squarely satisfies the criteria of
preventive self-defense, but is distinguishable from Tuwaitha and
the crisis at hand. While the latter two confrontations related to
the potential development of nuclear weapons, the Cuban Missile
Crisis involved the placement of strike-ready weapons. Although
the situs of coercion was the island state of Cuba, the actual
threat of action came from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union
began clandestine installation of a series of strategic nuclear

102. Id.at 212.
103. See Anthony DAmato, Editorial Comment, Israel's Air Strike Upon the
Iraqi NuclearReactor. 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 584, 585-87 (1983).
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missile sites in Cuba late in the summer of 1962. The United
States issued a public protest on October 22, 1962, after
discovery of the sites via reconnaissance overflight, and
announced a quarantine on all offensive military equipment
under shipment to Cuba. Over the next two days, the United
States raised the issue in the UN Security Council. Seeking to
induce the withdrawal of strategic weapons already in Cuba, the
United States characterized Soviet actions as a danger to both
peace and security and an overt threat of war in violation of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
The United States, which had previously expressed concern
about the build-up of armaments in Cuba, obtained immediate
ratification of its action by the Organization of American States
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 0 4 The United
Nations, however, did not sanction the United States action nor
did it condemn either party. Three draft resolutions were
presented to the Security Council. The first resolution, sponsored
by the United States, called for the immediate withdrawal of all
Soviet strategic weapons from Cuba. The second draft resolution,

sponsored by the Soviet Union, condemned the United States
blockade as a violation of the UN Charter. The third proposed
resolution sought mediation of the dispute in the General
Assembly. However, each proposal failed to pass in the Security
Council. In the face of an effective blockade and negative world
opinion, the Soviet Union decided to remove its missiles and stop
work on launch sites after October 28, 1962. In return, the
United States officially lifted its quarantine on weapons shipped
to Cuba on November 20, 1962.105
With the Soviet Union's declared policy of expansionism and
clear history of antagonism toward the United States, installation
of medium-range weapons inside the Distant Early Warning line
would have critically altered the balance of military power both
within the western hemisphere and worldwide. As a general
matter, the United States and the Soviet Union were continuously
engaged in diplomatic exchanges, and the United States had
publicized its protest.
Discovery of the nuclear threat occurred before the missiles
were launch-ready, but pursuit of a diplomatic solution might
have given the Soviet Union more time to ship additional missiles
and support equipment into Cuba, gaining an unassailable

104.

Statements by President John F. Kennedy (Sept. 4, 1962) (Sept. 13,

1963) 47 U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL. 450, 481, 715 (1962).

105.

See generally Carl Q. Christol & Charles R. Davis, Maritime Quarantine:

The Naval Interdictionof Offensive Weapons and Associated Materldl to Cuba, 1962,
57 AM. J. INr'L L. 525, 526-28 (1963); Wright, supra note 91; Polebaum, supra
note 98, at 205; Shoham, supra note 89, at 201.
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coercive advantage. The United States naval interdiction was
directed only at strategic offensive weapons bound for Cuba and
was imposed only after the Soviet Union's course of conduct made

a clearly threatening result possible.

Significantly limited in

intensity and magnitude, the Cuban quarantine was widely, and
properly, accepted as a lawful exercise of the right of self-defense.
In contrast to the quarantine of Cuba, the Israeli attack on
Tuwaitha was uniformly condemned. Given the factual similarity
between the Tuwaitha attack and the North Korean crisis,
application of the framework set forth above to the Tuwaitha raid
is instructive. 1 6 On June 7, 1980, Israeli Air Force fighters and
bombers attacked and destroyed the experimental Iraqi nuclear
The next day, Israeli Prime Minister
reactor at Tuwaitha.
Menachem Begin claimed that the reactor posed a threat to
More specifically, Israel contended that Iraq had
Israel.10 7
developed a nuclear weapon to attack Israeli territory. To support
this claim, Israel cited the following: Iraq's consistent refusal to
recognize Israel's right to exist; Iraq's refusal to reach a political
accommodation with Israel; the continued state of war between
Israel and Iraq, starting with the 1948 War of Independence;
Iraq's selection of a gas-graphite reactor for implementation of
nuclear technologies; Iraq's development of a laboratory capable
of handling and separating small quantities of weapons grade
material; and the admission by an Iraqi government official that
Iraq's nuclear reactor would be "the first Arab attempt toward
nuclear arming."10 8
The Israeli government noted that it had expressed its
concern regarding the Iraqi nuclear program with states that it
felt could assist n resolution of the problem. In response to
Israeli inquiries, both France and Italy, Iraq's source of nuclear

technologies, indicated that they would rely on International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to preclude weapons
proliferation. The United States, Israel's closest ally, merely
cautioned the French and the Italians regarding the importance of
Not comfortable with the efficacy of Agency
safeguards.
standards or the scope of international sanctions available and
concerned about the possible release of radioactive materials from
an operating reactor, the Israelis attacked Iraq's Tuwaitha facility
before the facility was operational. 1 0 9

106.
See Yost, supranote 94, at 16.
107. Shoha*m, supra note 89, at 191.
108. Id. at 204-16.
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Atomic Energy Comm'n, The Iraqi
109.
Nuclear Threat-Why IsraelHad to Act; 3-9, 14, 17-25, 29-34 (1981) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Why Israel Had to Act].
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It is important to note that operation of a gas-graphite,
uranium core reactor-for example, the French Orisis reactor at
Tuwaitha-could provide two means for development of weapons.
In the first method, the ninety-three percent enriched uranium
fuel could be diverted to direct production of nuclear weapons. 1 10
In the second method, irradiation of the enriched uranium fuel
produces another weapons grade material, plutonium. In light of
the technical evidence, the probability that Iraq intended to
develop nuclear weapons was high.
Given Iraq's manifest
belligerency, Israel reached the reasonable and logical conclusion
that it was the intended target of Iraq's aggression. The timing
and limited scope of the Israeli attack also fell well within the
parameters of proportional response to the threat.
Notwithstanding the evidence available to the Israeli
government prior to their action, a claim of preventive self-defense
cannot be justified. Application of Agency safeguards at Tuwaitha
and the expressed international interest in protecting the nonproliferation regime militated against any possible threat.]1 11
More importantly, Israel failed to pursue peaceful modalities of
resolution. There is no evidence that the Israelis attempted direct
or third-party negotiations with Iraq.
Furthermore, the matter was not raised before the United
Nations. 1 12 The UN Charter obliges members to submit disputes
which may endanger peace to the Security Council or the General
Assembly for resolution. Any reasonable model for application of
self-defense must adhere to this precept. Although a delay in the
United Nations response or a refusal to take action might have
justified unilateral action by Israel, Israel could not reasonably
assume that referral to the United Nations was futile or that the
Security Council would react indifferently to the evidence that
Israel later presented.
In acting unilaterally, the Israeli
government gave primacy to the preservation of its own

goal-security in a hostile, Arab world-and ignored the world
community's preference for mediation and application of the rule

110. In contracting for nuclear technology and supplies, Iraq rejected
France's proposal to provide a reactor using 3% enriched uranium fuel. Instead,
Iraq insisted that 93% enriched fuels be used. Notably, 3% enriched fuel is
capable of sustaining critical reaction for power production, but 93% enriched
fuel is required for weapons production. Id.
111. Following the attack, the Director General of the Agency characterized
Israel's action as a "serious threat to the entire [Agency] safeguards regime."
Burrus M. Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilitiesfrom MilitaryAttack- Prospects
After the Gulf War, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 524, 535 (1992). The UN Security Council
concurred, without abstention, labeling the act as a "clear violation of the Charter
... and the norms of International conduct." S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 36th
Sess., 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. RES/487 (1981).
112. Mallison & Mallison, supra note 89, at 427-28.
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of law. As a result, Israel's action fell outside the realm of lawful
self-defense.
Ill. A MODEB FOR ACTION
The critical issue in assessing the legitimacy of a preventive
self-defense strike against North Korea is the extent to which its
actions threaten world peace or an individual state's security.

North Korea's entry into the "nuclear club" presents a general
threat to international security and a specific threat to South
Korea. However, judging from the examples discussed above, it is
unlikely that the United Nations will respond to these threats.
Should an individual state or other organization consider an
armed response in the absence of a United Nations action, it must
first define the tangible threat, the objective to be attained by a
chosen action, and the consequences of each available alternative.
What, for example, are the United States interests in this
controversy? The United States political engagement strategy has
been to promote democratization of foreign governments and to
strengthen system-wide deterrence against aggression or unlawful
coercion. 1 3 The United States is also a party to the Mutual
Defense Treaty with South Korea, the probable target of North
Korean aggression. 1 14 The U.S. interests at issue are the
international regime for non-proliferation (symbolized by the U.S.
participation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty), the peaceful
resolution of controversies (demonstrated by the United States
membership in the United Nations), and the continued security
and independence of South Korea (illustrated by the United States
Mutual Defense Treaty with South Korea).
As part of its national security strategy, the United States
undertook to ensure a prohibition on proliferation in 1968.
Recognizing that aggression, or the threat of aggression, with
nuclear weapons would be a new situation, the United States
declared that it would act immediately to counter aggression or to
remove the threat of nuclear aggression in accordance with the
UN Charter and the inherent right of individual and collective

113.

Moore, supra note 86. at 11.

114. Each party is obligated to consult the other whenever the "security of
either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack" and to "maintain and
develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and... take suitable measures
. ."in response to any threat. Mutual Defense Treaty, Oct. 1, 1953, U.S.-Korea,
5 U.S.T. 2368, art. 2.
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self-defense. 115 As a member of the United Nations, the United
States must defer to the United Nations preference for pacific
settlement of conflict, but the United States also has a general
obligation to act in the best interests of international peace and
security. Actions taken to protect the rule of law, to promote
peaceful change, and to suppress aggression-by sanction or by
force of arms-comport with that obligation.
However, the United States ultimate interest is defined by the
moral and contractual obligations underlying the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and South Korea.
Having
declared the "common determination to . . . [act] so that no
potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either . . .
[state] stands alone," 116 the United States has announced that
the security and independence of South Korea are vital to the
United States own security. Without losing perspective of nuclear
proliferation's general threat to world peace, the United States
must treat a coherent threat of nuclear attack against South
Korea as a threat against the security of the United States.1 17
A

Defining the Threat

As discussed above, the foundation of preventive self-defense
requires a coherent nuclear threat: the potential aggressor must
have both the proclivity and the means to employ nuclear
weapons. Manifestation of the threat may be found in historically
acrimonious relationships or direct confrontation.
Technical
feasibility is dependent upon availability of fissionable material,
weapons production technologies, and a credible delivery system.

115. Declarationof the Government of the United States of America (1968), 7
I.L.M. 903-04 (1968).
116. Mutual Defense Treaty, supra note 114, at 237.
117. The United States moral obligation to respond in a mutual or
multilateral defense treaty is addressed in a draft presidential policy statement.
Originally intended as a tool to help the President determine when to send
peacekeeping forces overseas, Presidential Review Document 13 [hereinafter the
Document] is now viewed as "a framework for deciding when our interests are at
stake." The Document declares that unilateral military response Is justified only
for a "Level One" crisis. A Level One crisis is defined as a direct threat to United
States security, such as an attack on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization party
or other defense treaty party. See Lucy Howard & Gregory Cerio, The Clinton
Doctrine, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 1994, at 6. Significantly, the Document also
defines "discovery of long range nuclear weapons in an unstable region" as a Level

One crisis. If North Korea is characterized as an unstable region, confirmation

that North Korea had possession of nuclear weapons technologies and long range

delivery systems would place the current crisis exceedingly close to the Level One
crisis criteria. Any action taken before the discovery of a launch-ready weapon
would then be characteristic of preventive self-defense, while action taken after
such a discovery must be characterized as preemptive. See supra note 100.
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In the current crisis, action in self-defense is permissible because
a true nuclear threat exists. On the whole, there is substantial
evidence that North Korea intends to use nuclear weapons as a
coercive force on the peninsula and is rapidly approaching the
technical capability to do so.
Relations between North Korea and South Korea have long
been replete with conflict. Artificially divided at the end of World
War II, the North and the South developed in the mold of their
administrators, the Soviet Union and United States, respectively.
Rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States
eventually resulted in the formation of two separate states: the
Stalinist regime headed by Kim 1-Sung in the north and the
democratic republic south of the thirty-eighth parallel. Since
September 1948, North Korea has claimed authority over the
entire peninsula and has branded South Korea illegitimate.1 1 8

Three years of open, armed conflict between the North and
the South drew in the armed forces of the United States-under
the color of United Nations sanction-and the People's Republic of
China, but resolved nothing. The Korean War was concluded by
Despite dramatic changes of
armistice on July 27, 1953.
territorial control during the war, the Military Demarcation Line
established by the armistice gave little territorial advantage to
either the North or the South.1 19 Since then, official diplomatic
ties have been eschewed.
In the four decades following the Korean War, North Korea
has pursued a strategy of insurgency, seeking to weaken the
South's infrastructure and to increase the likelihood of a victory
in a future blitzkrieg. After numerous border provocations in the
first ten years of "peace," open but undeclared conflict erupted
again from 1966 to 1969, with 450 firefights and 550 incidents of
fire across the Demilitarized Zone, causing a total of more than
four thousand casualties on both sides.12 0 Discouraged by the
combined resistance of the United States and South Korea in this
confrontation, the North Korean government has since sanctioned
terrorist attacks on a variety of unlawful targets, including the
1 22
President of South Korea, 12 1 South Korean cabinet members,
118.
(1988).

See JON HALLIDAY & BRUCE CUMMINGS, KOREA: THE UNKNOWN WAR 15-69

119.

Id. at 71-219; see generally JAMES L. STOKEsBURY, A SHORT HISTORY OF

THE KOREAN WAR (1988); ROSEMARY FOOT, THE WRONG WAR:
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT, 1950-1953 (1985).

AMERICAN POLICY AND.

120. DANIEL P. BOLGER, SCENES FROM AN UNFINISHED WAR:
CONFLICT IN KOREA, 1966-1969, at 111-114 (1991).
121.
Id. at 62-65.

LOW-INTENSITY

122. Seventeen South Korean nationals, including four cabinet members,
were killed when a bomb exploded on a Korean Airlines jet on the tarmac at
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and the general civilian population of South Korea. 12
These
belligerent acts are clearly within the ambit of unlawful
aggression and evince North Korea's disregard for South Korea's
sovereign integrity.
When viewed in the context of North Korea's historic
aggression towards South Korea, the course of North Korea's
technical development is particularly troubling.
A primary
concern is the availability and production of weapons-grade fissile
material. North Korea's reactor at Yongbyon is a dual purpose
facility, producing heat for steam power generation as well as
weapons-grade plutonium. 12 4 The facilities necessary to make
military use of the plutonium are also in operation. 12 5 Clearly,

the critical steps towards weapons production and delivery have
been taken. In sum, the history of unlawful North Korean
aggression and North Korea's technical nuclear capabilities
demonstrate that a nuclear threat warranting preventive self1 26
defense exists.

Rangoon. Michael Shapiro, Annals of Authoritarianism: Kim's Ransom, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 31, 1994, at 32, 34.
123. Korean Airlines Flight 858 was destroyed in flight after leaving Abu
Dhabi on Nov. 29. 1987, killing all 115 passengers on board. Two North Korean
agents, carrying a timed explosive device, had boarded the flight at Baghdad.
Placing the bomb in an overhead bin, they engaged the remote trigger before
disembarking at Abu Dhabi. The alleged purpose of the act was to interfere with
the 1988 Seoul Olympics by exposing South Korea's strategic vulnerability. Lally
Weymouth, Does Clinton Know Who He's Dealing With?, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,
1993, at A25.
124. See Why Israel Had to Act, supra note 109, at 11.

125. See supra note 30. These facilities are a uranium core concentration
plant for "target" manufacture and a "hot lab" for fissile material extraction.
Extraction itself requires removal of the fuel rods/targets from the reactor after
stabilization from critical reaction. U.S. intelligence estimates indicate that the
first confirmed shut-down of the Yongbyon reactor may have yielded twelve
kilograms of weapons grade plutonium--enough to make one or two bombs. Fuel
rods removed from the reactor in June 1994 are expected to yield more than twice
that amount. N. Koreans Plan to Quit U.N. Panel Immediately, SAN DIEGO UNION-

TRIBUNE, Jun. 14, 1994 at Al, A23. Having previously developed short-range and
medium-range ballistic missiles such as the SCUD, the North Koreans
successfully test-fired a ballistic missile capable of reaching nearly 1000
miles-the distance from Pyongyang to Osaka, Japan. Nelan, supra note 28, at
29; Holley, supra note 28, at 1; William Powell & Jane Whitmore, A Game of
Nuclear Poker,NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1993, at 41.
126. North Korea's conduct in the non-proliferation regime also raises
questions of intent. Despite obligations imposed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
North Korea sought and developed nuclear technologies while involved in dilatory
negotiations over the Safeguards Agreement. Once an agreement was put into
force, North Korea failed to provide accurate data regarding its nuclear materials,
refused to allow the full scope of Agency inspections, and protested the use of
credible third-party intelligence to justify a special-or demand-inspection of
undeclared sites. North Korea remains a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and its safeguards agreement with the Agency, but it continues to deny the
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To invoke the concept of preventive self-defense, any use of
force must be directed at the specific sources of the threat.
Lawful targets are limited to those facilities that are necessary for
Plutonium production
production of nuclear weapons.
facilities-specifically the Yongbyon reactor-storage sites, and
extraction or concentration facilities could each be targeted.
B. The Course ofAction
The United States government must examine its objectives
within the framework of international security and the nonproliferation regime.
Seeking the normalization of relations,
North Korea, South Korea, and the United States have remained
fully engaged in the diplomatic process over the last year, using
Informal discussions at the United Nations, consultation with
other interested states, and specific bilateral negotiations to
resolve all outstanding issues regarding North Korea's nuclear
program. At this juncture, the United States announced that its
intent is to bring North Korea into full compliance with its
obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, the
United States is negotiating for North Korea to receive inspections

at the two non-declared sites discussed above and to proceed with
previously
full implementation of the denuclearization agreement
12 7
reached between North Korea and South Korea.
In striving to achieve these objectives, the United States
should be concerned about the effects of both action and inaction.
An overt step to control North Korea's course, either by the
imposition of economic sanctions or by the use of force to destroy
potential weapons capabilities, risks the possibility of igniting
another war on the Korean peninsula. 128 On the other hand,
failure to take action may lead to cascading destabilization in the

Agency's right to special inspection and will not grant access to the sites in
controversy. Although no evidence exists which directly demonstrates that North
Korea has actually developed a nuclear weapon, a dispassionate analysis of North
Korea's technological course has led many states to conclude that North Korea's
ultimate goal is to obtain nuclear weapons. Nelan, supra note 28, at 28. Given

the history of conflict between North Korea and South Korea, the logical and
compelling conclusion is that North Korea Is likely to employ Its nuclear weapons

as a coercive force against South Korea.
127. Perry, supra note 3.
128. North Korea has declared that if "the United Nations Security Council
tries to put pressure on us and take 'collective sanctions' against us by

representing the will of a big Power, we will be compelled to take corresponding
effective self-defensive measures. We do not say empty words." U.N. Doc.
S/25538. supra note 50, at 45.
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Pacific. 12 9 First, North Korea may in fact develop a credible
nuclear force, thereby upsetting the military status quo on the
peninsula and prompting South Korea to seek re-introduction of
U.S. nuclear arms or to pursue development of its own deterrent
capability. Second, the Japanese, who have both ballistic missile
systems and fissionable material stockpiles, may choose to arm
themselves as a matter of self-defense. 1 3 0 Finally, North Korea
might choose to export its nuclear weapons capabilities, as it has
with its conventional arms, to other unstable regimes or terrorist

organizations.13 1
Frustrated by the lack of progress in the negotiations
between North Korea and the Agency, President Clinton has
publicly declared that the United States will not allow North Korea
to develop nuclear weapons.1 3 2 The underlying threat in this
declaration is that the United States may employ all available
forms of coercion, both peaceable and forcible. Over the past few
months, the United States position has softened. The United
States has offered "carrots" to North Korea, such as the
suspension of Team Spirit and the expansion of economic ties.
North Korea has accepted these "carrots" without a true quid pro
quo.

In the current context, North Korea has no reason to take
any U.S. threat seriously. By playing a waiting game, North
Korea has been allowed to take advantage of the situation.
Through dissembling and delay, North Korea has ignored the
standards of non-proliferation and has taken significant steps
towards nuclear weapons development without suffering any
international sanction.
History counsels that continued
appeasement will fail.
Therefore, at this juncture, direct
enforcement in the form of preventive self-defense should
supplant negotiation.
The model for preventive self-defense provides a reasoned and
legally sound course of action. With the critical prerequisite of
this model-the existence of a coherent threat-nearly at hand,
the United States should act to fulfill its duties to South Korea
and to exhaust the available avenues of peaceful resolution. As a

129.
The Japanese currently stockpile approximately 4.5 tons of plutonium
as a fuel supply for the fast breeder-reactor at Monju. In addition, development
of the Japanese H2 satellite launch system could readily be converted to ballistic
uses. North Korea Says Japan Plans to Make Nuclear Arms, AGENcE FRANCE

PRESE, Mar. 7, 1994, availableIn LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File.
130. Paul Dibb, Asla-Paciflc Security: Act Now to Avoid A RegionalArms Race,
INT'L HERALD TRi., Aug. 26, 1992, available In LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS
File; Powell & Whitmore, supra note 125, at 41.
131.
Richard Fisher, Price of Failurein North Korea, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 18,
1994, at A27.
132. Michael Kramer, PlayingNuclearPower, TIME, Feb. 28, 1994, at 45.
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signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a member of the
United Nations, the United States can raise North Korea's
continued non-compliance before the Security Council. A request

for action by the United Nations in the form of diplomatic and
economic sanctions represents the last viable means for pacific
resolution. If pursuit of peaceful resolution triggers North Korea's
threatened invasion of South Korea, a strike against nuclear
weapons source facilities would no longer be a matter of
anticipatory self-defense.
While seeking economic sanctions from the United Nations,
the United States should also impose unilateral economic
The
sanctions as an additional measure of lawful coercion.
South
and
United States significant allies in the region, Japan
Korea, should be strongly encouraged to join in these sanctions.
At the same time, the United States must overtly reinforce its
military forces in the Western Pacific and communicate to North
Korea that any initiation of hostilities will result in immediate and
overwhelming intervention by the United States.
Should the United Nations fail to impose sanctions in the
event that North Korea initiates hostilities, the United States may
Before taking action,
justifiably pursue unilateral action.
however, the United States must recognize that the use of force as
a preventive measure is no guarantee of success. If a strike fails,
North Korea will have an incentive to retaliate once it actually
achieves nuclear capability. Furthermore, any other aspiring
nuclear power might be disinclined to negotiate. However, failure
to act may lead to a similar result.

V.

CONCLUSION

Although the current crisis involves a broad spectrum of
international legal principles and policies, the principles of nonproliferation and self-defense are of primary concern. Given the
attendant risks of escalation and mass destruction in a nuclear
confrontation, the extension of nuclear weapons capability is a
destabilizing force and a significant threat to peace. When the
non-proliferation regime fails to prevent aggressive states from
developing nuclear weapons, international law must permit the
international community or individual states to take overt steps to
deny the deployment or use of those weapons.
In a case such as the North Korean crisis, the precepts of
preventive self-defense provide a principled means to determine
when' the international community must turn to force.
Sanctioning the use of preventive self-defense provides three
stabilizing results. First, it lessens the probability of an actual
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criteria-such as the coherence of the nuclear threat-that are
more workable and practical than imminency in the face of
potential mass destruction.
Third, preventive self-defense
reinforces the requirement that states must first pursue peaceful
modalities for conflict resolution before using other, non-peaceful
measures.
In contrast, the traditional, restrictive requirement of
imminency before self-defense fails to consider the realities of
nuclear confrontation. No state should be forced to await the
launch of a nuclear weapon before responding. Furthermore,
contemporaneous development of a nuclear response is inimical
to the principles of non-proliferation and the prospective goal of
nuclear disarmament.
Customary international law represents the commingling of
legal principle and policy. The breadth of customary international
law is defined by the generally accepted and sanctioned practices
of states, delimited first by policy.
When customary law
principles present an unworkable solution, or mandate an
illogical result, an imbalance in the law exists. In the Korean
crisis, application of the customary principle of self-defense, or
even the ideal of anticipatory self-defense, would be both
unworkable and illogical. In the face of a belligerent state that
has nuclear technologies and credible weapons delivery systems
at its disposal, the potential for mass destruction must be the
critical factor in the justification and timing of the potential
victim's response. Both policy and practice must move to resolve
the imbalance.

